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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, thirteen percent of all United States employers offer benefits to the
domestic partners of their employees.1 Larger companies, those with more than
5,000 employees, the figure is twenty-five percent.2 Benefits offered to domestic

1
John Hendren, Domestic-Partner Policies Increase in U.S. Companies Thirteen Percent
Offer Benefits, Study Says, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), June 29, 1997, available in 1997
WL 11959999; Christopher Calhoun, Wilson's Latest Anti-Gay Wedge Misses Board of
Regents: UC Employees Deserve What Major Businesses Already Concede: Domestic
Partner Benefits, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14002397; John Hendren,
Southern Baptists' Boycott Bucks a Trend/Thirteen Percent of All U.S. Employers Offer Health
Benefits to Partners of Gay Workers, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 30, 1997, available in 1997
WL 7430509.
2

See sources cited supra note 1.
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partners often include both hard and soft benefits.3 Hard benefits, which are
commonly called "cost intensive benefits," may include medical, vision, and dental
insurance along with pension or retirement benefits.4 Other benefits are referred to
as soft benefits and may include bereavement leave, legal services, employee
discounts, health and fitness programs, relocation policies, and child care.5
The number of companies offering such benefits has increased dramatically in
this decade. Over the past three or four years, the number of public and private
employers offering domestic partner benefits has increased from about 200 to over
600 in 1997.6 Some of the reasons cited by employers for offering such benefits
include employee recruitment and retention, and the employer's own nondiscrimination policy.7
However, not every employer offering such benefits include both heterosexual
and homosexual partners in their policy8 mainly because they believe heterosexuals
can legally marry, whereas, homosexuals cannot.9 Domestic partner benefits can be
defined in either narrow or broad terms.10 In the broad definition, employment
benefits are given to all individuals regardless of their marital status or sexual
orientation.11 On the other hand, the narrow definition extends benefits only to
homosexuals and their partners who are legally prohibited from getting married.12

3
Alice Rickel, Extending Employee Benefits to Domestic Partners: Avoiding Legal
Hurdles While Staying in Tune with the Changing Definition of the Family, 16 WHITTIER L.
REV. 737, 737 (1995); John O. White, UCSD Staff Home Page, Domestic Partner Benefits
Update (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http://orpheus.ucsd.edu/sa/partner.html>.
4

Id.

5

Id.

6
Assembly OKs Bill on Domestic-Partner Health Benefits, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June
3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3136863; Michael Bradford, Employers More at Ease with
Partner Benefits: Expert Michael Bradford, BUS. INS., Sept. 22, 1997, available in 1997 WL
8295421.
7

Julie Cohen Mason, Domestic Partner Benefits, MGMT. REV., Nov. 1, 1995, available in
1995 WL 8081062; Sherry Boschert, Domestic Partner Benefits: A Trend Toward Fairness,
an Update for News Media Executives, Produced by the National Lesbian and Gay Journalists
Association
(1997)
(visited
Mar.
1,
1998)
<http://www.nlgja.org/
programs/DP/DPtrend.html>; Human Rights Campaign, Domestic Partnership Benefits for
Same-Sex Couples, Achieving Domestic Partnership Benefits and Why They Matter (visited
Mar. 1, 1998) <http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplac/dp/index.html>; White, supra note 3.
8

Rickel, supra note 3, at 737.

9

Howard Pianko & Dean L. Silverberg, Domestic Partner Benefits on the Rise, What Are
the Legal and Tax Issues?, 218 N.Y.L.J. 96 (1997) [hereinafter Pianko & Silverberg].
10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Id.
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Of the companies that offer benefits for unmarried employees' partners, about half
exclude heterosexual couples.13
Employers offering these benefits to same-sex domestic partners only, may face
legal challenges such as marital status and sexual orientation discrimination or equal
protection arguments14 from their unmarried heterosexual employees. In addition,
states and municipalities have been increasing the potential of such litigation by
passing laws that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and marital
status especially in the areas of housing and employment.15
This Note examines the potential of such legal challenges when employers use
the narrow definition in structuring their domestic partner benefit programs. In
addition, avoiding challenges by simply not offering benefits will be discussed.
However, before discussing any discrimination issues, this Note will begin with
some background and definitions that will bring the reader up-to-date on domestic
partner benefits as they are interpreted today.
II. DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP DEFINED
A. Background: The Changing Definition of Family
Since 1970, the number of cohabitating Americans increased by more than 400
percent.16 Nearly three million of the 93 million households in the United States
consist of unmarried couples.17 Single-parent households make up an additional
fifteen percent of families. Many of these single-parents have unmarried partners.18
As these statistics show, the traditional family—a working dad, stay-at-home mom,

13

Jill Hodges, 'Partner' Benefits May Not Apply to Heterosexuals/Employers Can
Encounter Thickets When They Extend Benefits Beyond Traditional Boundaries, STAR TRIB.,
June 7, 1996, available in 1996 WL 6915860.
14

See cases cited infra pp. 22-35.

15
Lewis Becker, Recognition of Domestic Partnerships by Governmental Entities and
Private Employers, 1 NAT'L J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 90, 92 (1995)
<http://sunsite.unc.edu/gaylaw/issue1/becker.html>; see also Michele Matassa Flores, Bottom
Line Determines Benefits for Unmarried Partners, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 7, 1994, available in
1994 WL 3648933 ("The city of Seattle and King County have laws against discriminating on
the basis of sexual orientation or marital status.").
16
J. Robert Cowan, The New Family Plan: Employee Benefits and the Non-Traditional
Spouse, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 617, 618 (1993-94); David G. Richardson, Family Rights
for Unmarried Couples, 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 117, 117 (1993).
17
Cowan, supra note 16, at 618; D'Vera Cohn, Cohabitating Couples Are a Settled Bunch;
Many Unwed Partners Own Homes, Have Children, Census Reveals, WASH. POST, Mar. 20,
1994, available in 1994 WL 2277358; Ruth Padawer, Unwed, Uninsured Domestic Partners
Press for Reforms, RECORD, Dec. 5, 1993, available in 1993 WL 7909956.
18

Cowan, supra note 16, at 618.
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two kids and a dog—is near extinction.19 In fact, census data demonstrates fewer
than ten percent of current households consist of this so-called traditional family.20
The concept of family has largely been founded on the existence of marriage, but
the legal definition of family has become quite unsettled.21 Depending upon the
purpose, courts and legislatures have defined family differently.22 However, the U.S.
Census Bureau has remained somewhat with the traditional concept of family by
defining it as "two or more persons related by birth, marriage or adoption who reside
in the same household.”23
More and more Americans today are expanding this concept of family by
thinking of family as people to whom they have some emotional tie as opposed to
merely a bloodline relationship.24 In 1989, a survey conducted by Massachusetts
Mutual Life Insurance Company asked 1,200 randomly selected adults to define the
word "family."25 Almost three-quarters of the survey respondents chose the more
broad description of family as being "a group of people who love and care for one
another."26 Only twenty-two percent of the respondents chose the traditional
description of family as being "group of peoples related by blood, marriage, or
adoption."27
In California, a task force on the family designed a functional approach to family
by suggesting that family could be defined by the "functions" performed by each of
its members.28 These functions included:
(1) maintaining the physical health and safety of family members by
providing for their shelter, food, clothing, health care, and economic
sustenance; (2) providing conditions for emotional growth, motivation,
and self-esteem within a context of love and security; (3) helping to shape
a belief system from which goals and values are derived, and encouraging
shared responsibility for family and community; (4) teaching social skills
and critical thinking, promoting life-long education, and providing

19
Frank Swoboda, Extending the Benefits Umbrella to a Wider World; Consulting Firm
Finds Relatively Few Firms Making Domestic Partners Eligible, WASH. POST, June 4, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 2096955.
20

Suzanne B. Goldberg, Employment Benefits and Insurance: Working with Your Client to
Achieve Full and Equal Benefits, 232 PRACTICING L. INST. 157, 159 (1994).
21
Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of “Family,” 26 GONZ. L.
REV. 91, 96 (1990/1991).
22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id. at 97; see also Richardson, supra note 16, at 119.

26

Treuthart, supra note 21, at 97.

27

Richardson, supra note 16, at 119.

28

Id. Treuthart, supra note 21, at 97.

1999]

DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP BENEFITS

285

guidance in responding to culture and society; and (5) creating a place for
recreation and recuperation from external stresses.29
This functional definition of family is consistent with societal policies of the
promotion of marriage and the encouragement of stable families.30 It is possible to
have traditional families based on a legal marriage where none of the above
mentioned functions are present. This type of family may further the societal policy
of the promotion of marriage, but it does not encourage or further the policy of
family stability.31
If we were to use this functional approach to families, many non-traditional
families, such as those not based on a valid marriage, would be legitimized.32 As it
applies to domestic partner benefits, only those families that promote societal family
values would be extended such benefits.33 Companies would not have to worry about
unmarried employees signing up "roommates" or "friends."34
In addition to the American public redefining the concept of family, our courts
have begun to recognize that the traditional concept of family is changing. For
instance, in 1989, the New York Court of Appeals decided that the definition of
family should be interpreted broadly. The court in Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.
believed a more realistic view of a family includes a long-term relationship
"characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence."35
In Braschi, a life partner of a deceased tenant in a rent-controlled apartment moved
for a preliminary injunction to prevent eviction.36 Under New York City Rent and
Eviction Regulations, a landlord, upon the death of a rent-control tenant, may not
dispossess "either the surviving spouse of the deceased tenant or some other member
of the deceased tenant's family who has been living with the tenant."37 The court
believed that the determination as to whether an individual is entitled to noneviction
protection under these regulations should be based upon an objective examination of
the parties' relationship.38 The court suggested a number of factors including:
exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, level of emotional and financial
commitment, manner in which the parties held themselves out to society, and the
reliance each of the parties placed on the other for daily family services.39

29

Treuthart, supra note 21, at 97.

30

Richardson, supra note 16, at 119.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 54 (N.Y. 1989).

36

Id. at 51.

37

Id. at 50.

38

Id. at 55.

39

Id. See, e.g., Joan E. Schaffner, The Essence of Marriage, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 195,
204 (1997) (book review) ("[T]he court, in deciding whether Mr. Braschi and his male
life-partner of ten years comprised a ‘family’ under the New York rent control regulations,
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Since Braschi, New York has amended its rent control ordinance to include eight
enumerated factors to determine whether a family exists:
1) the longevity of the relationship; 2) sharing of household and family
expenses; 3) intermingling of finances as evidenced by joint bank
accounts, personal and real property, credit cards, and loan obligations; 4)
engaging in family-type activities such as jointly attending family
functions and social and recreational activities; 5) formalizing of legal
obligations and responsibilities to each other by executing wills naming
each other as executor and beneficiary, conferring upon each other the
authority to make health care decisions, and making a domestic
partnership declaration; 6) holding themselves out as family members to
other family members and society in general; 7) regularly performing
family functions such as caring for each other or each other's extended
family members, and 8) engaging in any other action which evidences the
intention of creating a long-term, emotionally-committed relationship.40
These eight enumerated factors came directly out of the Braschi decision.41
The Braschi court recognized that the legal or traditional definition of family was
inconsistent with the purpose of the rent-control ordinance which was to protect
sudden eviction of family members.42 This court emphasized relational interests
instead of legal and bloodline interests when defining a family.43
In 1983, the California courts also recognized that unmarried couples could be
similar in relationship to that of a married couple.44 In Butcher v. Superior Court of
Orange County, a woman sued for loss of consortium when her live-in-partner
suffered personal injuries after being struck by an automobile driven by Butcher.45
At the time of the accident, the couple had lived together for eleven and one half
years, had two children together, filed joint income tax returns, and had joint bank
accounts.46 Butcher moved for summary judgment on the woman's claim based on
the argument that there was no valid or legal marriage between the couple. The trial
court denied Butcher's motion and he appealed.47 The appellate court recognized a
right of the unmarried woman to bring a claim of loss of consortium where the
plaintiff can show that the relationship parallels that of a marital relationship.48 The
explained that a ‘more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two
adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and
financial commitment and interdependence.’).
40

Richardson, supra note 16, at 120.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange County, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).

45

Id. at 59.

46

Id. at 60.

47

Id.

48

Id. at 70.
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court concluded that "evidence of the stability and significance of the relationship
could be demonstrated by the duration of the relationship; whether the parties have a
mutual contract; the degree of economic cooperation and entanglement; exclusivity
of sexual relations; and whether there is a 'family' relationship with children."49
Thus, the court recognized that more than a relationship's legal status should be
considered when granting consortium rights to couples.50
However, not all courts are willing to set tradition aside and opt for the more
modern view of family relationships. In Elden v. Sheldon, the Supreme Court of
California overruled Butcher.51 The court believed the inquiry as to whether a
relationship was "stable and significant" was too difficult a burden to impose on the
courts.52 The court gave a laundry list of cases supporting its holding that a loss of
consortium claim is founded on a legal marriage, and absent such a marital
relationship, the right to recover does not exist.53
Many private organizations have also thrown their hats into the ring to come up
with definitions of family that meet the modern trend towards broad definition. The
Home Economics Association defines family as:
[T]wo or more persons who share resources, share responsibilities for
decisions, share values and goals, and have commitments to one another
over a period of time. The family is that climate that one comes home to;
and it is that network of sharing and commitment that most accurately
describes the family unit, regardless of blood, legalities, adoption or
marriage.54
In 1978, the American Humanist Association stated "any two people...wishing to
make a commitment to one another...should be considered a family...and receive
those benefits accorded to families by society. Blood kinship should not be required
of family members, nor should marriages."55 In addition, in December 1994, the
U.S. Office of Personnel Management published a new rule that defines family as
"spouses, parents, children, brothers and sisters and their spouses and 'any individual
related by blood or affinity whose close association with the employee is the
equivalent of a family relationship.'"56 It is hoped that this new rule will allow
federal workers use of their sick leave to provide care for ill domestic partners.57

49

Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 70.

50

Richardson, supra note 16, at 120.

51

Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 590 (Cal. 1988).

52

Id.

53

Id. at 589.

54

Factoids on Domestic Partnership
<http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-fac.html>.
55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id.

Benefits

(visited

Mar.

1,

1998)

288

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 13:281

It should be noted, however, that not everyone subscribes to this new broad
definition of family.58 The National Pro-Family Coalition adopted at the 1981 White
House Conference on Families the following definition of family: "persons who are
related by blood, marriage or adoption."59 The Coalition's definition excludes
"committed relationships established by unmarried heterosexual partners and lesbian,
gay, or bisexual partners, as well as any children in their relationships."60 In
addition, the definition excludes "'marriages' or commitments among more than two
adults and relationships between stepparents and stepchildren--even though such
individuals might very strongly identify themselves as being family members of one
another."61
However, the broader definition of family seems to be winning out. For
example, in 1992, the American Heritage Dictionary changed the words "blood,
marriage or adoption" in its definition of family, and, instead, described it as "[t]wo
or more people who share goals or values, have long-term commitments to one
another, and reside usually in the same dwelling place."62
Although there are cases where the courts are reluctant to redefine the traditional
concept of family, it is clear from the attitudes of the American public and cases
where the courts have applied a broader definition that a gradual change in the status
of the nontraditional family is occurring. While some jurisdictions are ready to
redefine the concept the family, others are not.63 As a result, it is still unclear as to
how these nontraditional family relationships will be treated by employers when
offering benefits to their employees.
B. Definition and Requirements
1. What is a Domestic Partnership?
Although there is currently no standard legal definition of a domestic partnership,
most definitions include the following elements: "1) the couple live together and
have a close, personal relationship; 2) they are responsible for each other's welfare,
as evidenced by financial interdependence; 3) they are not legally married to anyone
else; 4) they are not related by blood."64 Not every definition of domestic partnership
includes heterosexual and homosexual partners. For example, Stanford University

58
Kris Franklin, "A Family Like Any Other Family:" Alternative Methods of Defining
Family Law, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1027, 1029 (1990/1991).
59

Id.

60

Id. at 1030.

61

Id.

62

Living in the Past, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3684053.

63

Stephen N. Hargrove, Domestic Partnerships Benefits: Redefining Family in the Work
Place, 6 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 49, 52 (1994).
64
Sample Proposal for Domestic Partner Benefits (visited Mar. 1, 1998)
<http://www.hrc.org> [hereinafter Sample Proposal]; See also Christine Woolsey, Benefits for
Domestic Partners No Longer Rare, BUS. INS., Apr. 4, 1994, available in 1994 WL 3834290
("Most domestic partner definitions include three requirements: the partners must be involved
in a committed relationship; must live together; and must be financially interdependent.").
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defines a domestic partner as "the partner of an eligible employee who is of the same
sex and shares a long-term commitment."65
Regardless of gender requirements, it appears that domestic partnership is more
than cohabitation without the legal status of marriage.66 The major advantage of
domestic partnership is the increasing recognition of the entity by both business and
government through the offering of employment benefits that traditionally have only
been offered to legally married couples.67 It has become a means through which
equality can be achieved among all employees regardless of sexual orientation, and
in some instances, marital status.68
2. Domestic Partnership Ordinances
Domestic partnership registration is currently available in a limited number of
jurisdictions.69 This registration procedure is established through local ordinance.70
Registration usually involves the filing of an affidavit attesting to the creation of
such partnership and the payment of a small fee.71 Various eligibility requirements,
often resembling those requirements to enter into marriage, may be imposed on the
applicants.72 Common requirements may include: "the parties be at least 18 years
old, that each be mentally competent, that the parties not be related by blood ties
closer than would bar marriage in the state, and that neither of the parties have an
existing marriage or domestic partnership."73 Some may require that a previous
domestic partnership have been terminated for a minimum period of time before a
new registration can be filed.74
In addition, ordinances may require that the parties reside together, declare they
have a committed relationship, and assume an obligation for the basic living
expenses of the other.75 Some municipalities may require additional formalities such
as witnesses, notarization of declaration, and statements under oath concerning the
partners' qualifications.76 In some cities, the registration becomes part of public
record. For example, Ann Arbor and San Francisco registrees are given the option to
have the registration filed or to simply retain a copy to be shown on an as needed
65
Donald E. Coleman, UC Weighs Partner Benefits. Faculty, Staff and Students Would Be
Included in the University's Plan, FRESNO BEE, July 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3910818.
66

Raymond C. O'Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Responsibility, 32 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 163, 164 (1995).
67

Id.

68

Id. at 166.

69

Treuthart, supra note 21, at 101.

70

Id. at 101-02.

71

Id. at 102.

72

Becker, supra note 15, at 91.

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.
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basis.77 In addition, some cities require that at least one partner reside or work in the
city.78
In general, ordinances allow for termination of the domestic partnership by a
unilateral act of one of the partners.79 A statement or affidavit of termination usually
must be filed with the city and a copy of such notice must be sent to the other
partner.80 Termination of the partnership automatically occurs upon the death of one
of the partners.81
The City of Berkeley, California was the first city to adopt a domestic partnership
ordinance.82 The policy was adopted on December 4, 1984 with dental coverage
being available on April 1, 1985 and medical coverage available on July 1, 1985.83
Its policy requires couples to file an affidavit attesting that they have lived together
at least six months and "share common necessities of life."84 Each partner must be at
least eighteen years old, "declare that they are each other's sole domestic partner and
that they are 'responsible for their common welfare.'"85 A statement of termination
must be filed when the partnership is dissolved.86 A new partnership could not be
entered into for at least six months.87
Today, over fifty municipalities offer some sort of domestic partnership plan.88
State employers include Commonwealth of Massachusetts, State of New York, and
State of Vermont.89
77

Becker, supra note 15, at 91.

78

Id. (Minneapolis and San Francisco limit joint or domestic partnership registration to
couples where at least one partner lives or works in the city. Other cities, such as Berkeley
and West Hollywood allow non-residents to register.).
79

Id.

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Robert L. Eblin, Domestic Partnership Recognition in the Workplace: Equitable
Employee Benefits for Gay Couples (and Others), 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1067, 1072 (1990).
83

Id. at 1072.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

Eblin, supra note 82, at 1072.

88

A Look at Employers Offering Domestic Partner Health Benefits, GANNETT NEWS
SERVICE, July 22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8832628 (municipalities include: Alameda,
California; Ann Arbor, Michigan; Atlanta, Georgia; Baltimore, Maryland; Boston,
Massachusetts; Brookline, Massachusetts; Burlington, Vermont; Cambridge, Massachusetts;
Carrboro, North Carolina; Chapel Hill, North Carolina; Chicago, Illinois; Corvallis, Oregon;
Denver, Colorado; East Lansing, Michigan; Hartford, Connecticut; Iowa City, Iowa; Ithaca,
New York; Laguna Beach, California; Los Angeles, California; Madison, Wisconsin;
Middlebury, Vermont; New Orleans Louisiana; New York, New York; Oakland, California;
Oak Park, Illinois; Olympia, Washington; Portland, Maine; Rochester, New York;
Sacramento, California; San Diego, California; San Francisco, California; Santa Cruz,
California; Seattle, Washington; Shorewood Hills, Wisconsin; Springfield, Massachusetts; St.
Paul, Minnesota; Takoma Park, Maryland; Tucson, Arizona; West Hollywood, California;
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In addition, some smaller municipalities are beginning to recognize domestic
partnerships. In May of 1997, the 11,700 person town of Tumwater, Alaska became
one of the smallest towns in America to grant benefits to domestic partners of
municipal employees.90 The town is hoping that this will attract and maintain good
employees.91
3. Private Employers
The extension of domestic partner benefits in the private sector is generally seen
as an outgrowth of such coverage at the government level.92 However, domestic
partnership in the private sector can be traced as far back as 1982 when a union at
New York's Village Voice newspaper obtained domestic partner benefits for its
employees.93 Up to 1990, only five companies offered benefits to domestic
partners.94 However, one commentator estimates that since then, there has been at
least a one-hundred percent increase in the number of companies offering such
benefits each year.95
Private employers may require registration and other eligibility requirements
similar to those imposed by municipalities offering benefits to domestic partners.96
In most situations, the couple wanting to acquire benefits under a domestic
partnership must sign an affidavit.97 Ideal affidavits will resemble the terms of a
legal marriage.98 According to the Partners Task Force for Gay and Lesbian
Couples, the elements of an ideal affidavit include:
(1) Neither of us is married[; (2)] We are both over 18 years of age[; (3)]
We were mentally competent to consent to contract when our domestic
West Palm Beach, Florida; Alameda County, California; Arlington County, Virginia; Dane
County, Wisconsin; Hennepin County, Minnesota; King County, Washington; Los Angeles
County, California; Marin County, California; Multnomah County, Oregon; San Francisco
County, California; San Mateo County, California; Santa Cruz County, California; Travis
County, Texas; and Wayne County, Michigan).
89
Id. See also Hargrove, supra note 63, at 50 (Ohio gives state employees sick and
bereavement leave to care for domestic partners).
90

Small Town Grants Benefits to Domestic Partners of City Workers, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, May 11, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11488726.
91

Id.

92

Linda M. Laarman, Employer Health Coverage for Domestic Partners--Identifying the
Issues, EMPLOYEE REL. L.J., Mar. 22, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2938897.
93
Terry Wilson, Family Values Despite the Disney Brouhaha, Domestic Partnership
Benefits Are Widely Available for Same-Sex Couples. So Why Are Very Few Taking
Advantage of Them?, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3563332.
94

Id.

95

Id.

96

Becker, supra note 15, at 97.

97

Anatomy of a Domestic Partnership Affidavit, the Good, the Ugly, and the Bad (visited
Mar. 1, 1998) <http://www.buddybuddy.com/affidavi.html>.
98

Id.
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partnership began[; (4)] We are the sole domestic Partner of each other
and have no other domestic partners[; (5)] We agree to give notification of
any change in the status of our agreement[; (6)] We share the common
necessities of life and are responsible for each other's welfare[; and (7)]
We declare under penalty of perjury that these statements are true and
correct.99
These affidavits can make partners potentially liable for each other's support and
debts;100 therefore, before signing such an affidavit, an attorney should be
consulted.101
Although affidavits have elements similar to a legal marriage, those couples who
are married do not have to sign such an affidavit. Documents relating to domestic
partnerships can be quite costly to prepare and maintain; whereas, married couples
do not have the expense of preparing these documents and obtain more benefits than
couples living in a domestic partnership. Some employers may require additional
documentation including one or more of the following: (1) joint lease, mortgage, or
deed; (2) joint ownership of vehicle; (3) joint ownership of checking account or
credit account; (4) designation of the domestic partner as a beneficiary for the
employee's life insurance or retirement benefits; (5) designation of the domestic
partner as a beneficiary of the employee's will; (6) designation of the domestic
partner as holding power of attorney for health care; or (7) shared household
expenses.102
In addition, private employers may only offer benefits to same-sex couples and
not to unmarried heterosexual couples.103 Employers often cite the fact that
heterosexuals have the option to marry as the reason for the distinction.104
4. Costs and Other Concerns
However employers decide to structure their domestic partner benefits, costs
have proven to be relatively small.105 If a company chooses to extend benefits to
both homosexual and heterosexual domestic partners, enrollment increases range
from about one to ten percent.106 Program costs will vary depending upon the
99

Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Drucilla Stender Ramey, Model Domestic Partner Health Benefits Policy, the Ultimate
Employee
Handbook—A
Workshop
(visited
Mar.
1,
1998)
<http://www.courttv.com/legalhelp/business/seminars/handbook/domestic.html>.
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Id.
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Rickel, supra note 3, at 744.
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See generally Larry Holyoke, Domestic Partner Benefits Lag Behind Other Regions, ST.
LOUIS BUS. J. (visited Sept. 1, 1997) <http://www.amcity.com/stlouis/stories
/090197/focus3.html> (Principal Financial Group reports less than one percent enrollment
even though benefits are extended beyond same-sex couples and offered to a variety of nontraditional households); Jennifer Knight, Firms Add Domestic Partner Benefits for
Competitive Edge, CORP. CASHFLOW MAG., Aug. 1, 1994, available in 1994 WL 12790380
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benefits covered and the portion of the benefit paid by the employer.107 In addition,
companies offering medical benefits may experience a higher initial cost because
many of these new unmarried partners have been left out of the medical system for a
while.108
Low utilization of domestic partner benefits can be attributed to a number of
factors. These include: domestic partner may already receive benefits from another
source; employee may be reluctant to disclose his or her personal relationship to the
employer; benefits paid to unmarried partners are taxable; employees may be
hesitant about signing a legal document which declares financial responsibility for
the partner; and insurability problems such as pre-existing conditions may preclude
coverage.109 These factors may explain why few employees who have access to such
benefits use them.110
Of the small number of employees that do take advantage of such benefits, costs
tend to be lower than those of their married counterparts.111 The lower costs may be
attributed to eligible employees being younger and healthier.112 In addition, they
tend not to have children that need to be covered as dependents.113

(there is a one to two percent participation for same-sex couples and a two to four percent
average for opposite-sex couples); Less Than One Percent Use Domestic Partner Benefits,
TAMPA TRIB., May 4, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10785279 (Hewitt Associates found that
when heterosexual couples were included, the participation rate sometimes reached three to
four percent); Ann Merrill, Domestic Partners//Many Companies Talking About Issue, but
Few Have Done Anything About It, STAR-TRIB., Jan. 26, 1994, available in 1994 WL 8435226
(if heterosexual couples are included, usage is about six percent); Elizabeth Neus, Report:
Domestic Partner Benefits Cost Same as Heterosexual Married Couples, GANNETT NEWS
SERVICE, July 22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8832662 (companies that also cover
heterosexual partners find that the coverage costs one to three percent of their medical benefits
budget); Jane-Ellen Robinet, Local Employers Wet Toes in Domestic Partner Benefits, PITT.
BUS. TIMES & J., Aug. 28, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7907346; Boschert, supra note 7 (if
opposite-sex couples are included, enrollment may increase up to ten percent at most); Sample
Proposal, supra note 64 (when offered to both same and opposite sex partners, enrollments
increased less than three percent); Wilson, supra note 93 (including heterosexual couples
boost costs about three percent).
107

Hodges, supra note 13.

108

GTE Testing New Family Health Centers, BUS. INS., July 26, 1993, available in 1993
WL 7806631.
109
Id. See also Study Says Domestic Partners Not Costly, MED. & HEALTH, June 5, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 7721935 [hereinafter Study Says].
110

Jonathan Marshall, Domestic Partners Benefits Unused, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May
31, 1995, available in 1995 WL 5283839.
111

Talila Baron, Extending Health Benefits to 'Domestic Partners' Fast Becoming Good
Business, BUS. J., Apr. 11, 1994, available in 1994 WL 13107329.
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Rickie Windle, More Companies Exploring Domestic Partner Benefits, Those Who
Offer It Say It Hasn't Caught on Yet, AUSTIN BUS. J., Mar. 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL
10029684.
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When same-sex partners are involved, companies often worry that costs will
increase due to HIV and AIDS related claims.114 However, the U.S. Government and
insurance actuaries have estimated that heart disease, cancer, and the costs of
premature birth can be much higher than the lifetime cost of treating a person with
AIDS.115 For example, the average lifetime medical cost for treatment of HIV is
$119,000 per patient as compared to premature infant care which can cost up to $1
million.116
In addition to cost concerns, employers may fear that domestic partner provisions
invite fraud.117 Critics argue that employees will enroll sick friends and relatives.
However, no evidence of fraud has been demonstrated thus far.118 Because of the
requirements employees must meet to qualify for domestic partnership, it is unlikely
there will be substantial fraud.119 In addition, the threat of discharge and/or criminal
sanctions will likely deter any fraudulent claims by employees.120
If an employee should sign up a sick friend or relative, pre-existing condition
clauses may limit benefits for illnesses existing on enrollment.121 In addition, the
employee may have to pay more in premium than the friend or relative will receive
in benefits.122 Therefore, fraud and abuse of domestic partnership benefits seems to
be minimal or nonexistent. The fraud and abuse should be no more than that which
currently exists with marriage.123 Companies normally do not ask for proof of
marriage, and employees are generally free to sign up their spouses.124
As this discussion reveals, cost concerns and potential for abuse is minimal in the
area of domestic partner benefits. Companies extending benefits to both same- and
opposite-sex domestic partners will find that their costs are slightly higher than those
employers that offer benefits to same-sex couples only.125 This is because there will

114

Rickel, supra note 3, at 745.
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Partner Benefits Uncommon, but Not Costly, Says Study, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 4,
1995, available in 1995 WL 10009089 [hereinafter Partner Benefits Uncommon]; See also
Jean Latz Griffin, Push for Domestic-Partner Benefits Picking Up Steam, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 8,
1993, available in 1993 WL 11121378; Aurora Mackey, Domestic Partner Benefits Are
Catching on Slowly; Employers' Experiences Show Providing Benefits for Domestic Partners
Costs No More Than Doing Do for Heterosexual Married Couples, BUS. & HEALTH, Apr. 1,
1994, available in 1994 WL 13102164; Diane Stafford, In Giving Benefits, Fair Is Fair, KAN.
CITY STAR, Mar. 21, 1996, available in 1996 WL 2423708.
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be more heterosexuals than homosexuals taking advantage of these benefits.126
However, employers find that their fears are unwarranted and are generally pleased
with the outcome of their program.127
5. Tax Implications
Section 106 of the Internal Revenue code excludes from the employee's gross
income employer-provided group health insurance coverage for the employee, the
employee's spouse, and the employee's dependents.128 Section 105(b) of the Code
excludes from the employee's gross income any additional benefits received through
the employer-provided health coverage that directly relate to medical expenses
incurred by the employee, his or her spouse, and dependents.129 However, section
104(a)(3) of the Code requires that the employee pay taxes on the difference between
the fair market value of such coverage and the amount the employee paid for the
coverage if the employer-provided health insurance is extended to anyone besides
the employee, his or her spouse and dependents. Additional benefits such as those
discussed in 105(b) of the Code are also to be included in the employee's gross
income if those benefits were extended to any person other than the employee, his or
her spouse, and dependents.130
In private letter rulings, the IRS has deferred to state law in defining the term
"spouse." However, in its most recent ruling in January of 1997, the IRS relied on
the newly enacted Defense of Marriage Act in defining the term.131 The Defense of
Marriage Act provides that same-sex domestic partners will not be treated as spouses
in regards to any federal law.132 The IRS concluded that same-sex partners could not
be afforded the preferential tax treatment that has been afforded to spouses.133
However, the partner may still qualify as a dependent under section 152 of the
Code allowing the partner preferential treatment as the employee's dependent.134
Section 152(a)(9) of the Code defines a dependent for income tax purposes as any
individual residing in the taxpayer's home that receives more than half of his or her
support from the taxpayer.135 However, section 152(b)(5) of the Code provides that
such dependent cannot be claimed for income tax purposes if the relationship
126
Hodges, supra note 13 (about two-thirds of participants are heterosexual couples);
Partner Benefits Uncommon, supra note 116 (about 67% of the couples electing coverage are
opposite-sex); See also Study Says, supra note 109.
127

Rickel, supra note 3, at 747.
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Hargrove, supra note 63, at 55; William V. Vetter, Restrictions on Equal Treatment of
Unmarried Domestic Partners, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 5 (1995); Laarman, supra note 92;
Pianko & Silverberg, supra note 9.
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between the taxpayer and the dependent is in violation of local law.136 In other
words, if state law prohibits cohabitation between unmarried people, then the
domestic partner could not qualify as a dependent.137
If the domestic partner does not qualify as a dependent under these provisions,
the employee will be taxed on the value of the coverage pursuant to section 61 of the
Code.138 The IRS held in a private letter ruling that the fair market value used to
calculate the amount on which the employee is to pay taxes should be determined by
the value of the group rate.139 However, the IRS did not elaborate on how to
determine the fair market value of group coverage other than to say it could be less
or more than individual coverage or the subjective value of the coverage to the
employee.140
Employers offering benefits to domestic partners will have to determine the fair
market of value of such benefits for withholding and reporting purposes. This may
be a difficult process due to lack of clear guidelines from the IRS.141 However, a
company considering the offering of such benefits might be wise to ask for
assistance on such calculation from employers already offering such benefits.
C. Marriage v. Domestic Partnership: How Do Benefits Compare?
Marriage is generally a relationship between two individuals and the state,
whereas, a domestic partner benefit plan is a relationship between two individuals
and an employer or between two individuals and a municipality.142 Individuals
barred from marriage or choosing not to get married can spend as much as $3,000 on
legal related expenses to set up a domestic partnership, whereas, a marriage license
typically costs about $35.143 In addition, marriage licenses self perpetuate, and
domestic partnerships may require additional expense in the periodic review of legal
documents.144
The Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples charts the comparison of
benefits for marriage and domestic partnerships. The following is a partial
representation of this chart.145
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Benefits Comparison at the State Level

1. Assumption of Spouse’s Pension
2. Bereavement Leave
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Burial Determination
Certain Property Rights
Child Custody
Crime Victim’s Recovery Benefits
Divorce Protections
Domestic Violence Intervention

9. Exemption of Property Tax on
Partner’s Death
10. Housing Lease Transfer

Legal Marriage
Automatic
Automatic in
most places
Automatic
Automatic
Automatic
Automatic
Automatic
Automatic

11. Inheritance

Automatic where
available
Automatic where
Available
Automatic

12. Immunity from Testifying
13. Insurance Breaks
14. Joint Adoption and Foster Care

Automatic
Automatic
Probable

15. Joint Bankruptcy
Automatic
16. Joint Parenting (Insurance Coverage,
Automatic
School Records)
17. Medical Decisions on Behalf of Partner Automatic

18. Reduced Rate Memberships
19. Sick leave to care for partner
20. Visitation of Partner’s Children
21. Visitation of Partner in hospital
(intensive care)
22. Visitation of Partner in Prison
23. Wrongful death benefits
(Loss of consort)

Domestic Partnership
No
Only certain
workplaces
No
No
No
No
No
Only in some
jurisdictions
No
Only in New York
City
Will necessary and is
Contestable. Domestic
Partnership could
Influence court
Decision
No
No
No. Often reviewed by
court. Some states
prohibit adoption and
foster care.
No
No

No. Physician’s
directives or powers of
attorney are necessary
with few exceptions
Automatic where
Only certain
available
organizations
Automatic where
Only certain
available
organizations
Probable, depending No. Often must go to
on divorce decree
court.
Automatic
often prohibited.
Physician’s directives
or powers of attorney
must be drawn.
Automatic
Only certain cities
Automatic
No

Benefits Comparison in the Federal System
(Includes Civil Servants and the Military)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Access to Military Stores
Assumption of Spouse’s Pension
Bereavement Leave
Insurance Breaks
Medical Decisions on Behalf of Partner
at Military of VA Hospitals
6. Sick Leave to Care for Partner

Legal Marriage
Automatic
Automatic
Automatic
Automatic
Automatic

Domestic Partnership
No
No
No
No
No

Automatic

No
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7. Veteran’s Discounts
8. Visitation of Partners in Hospital or
Prison

Domestic Partnership
No
No

Legal Marriage
Automatic
Automatic

Benefits Comparison for All U.S. Citizens
1. Immigration
2. Social Security Survivor Benefits

Legal Marriage
Automatic
Automatic

Domestic Partnership
No
No

As this comparison shows, the benefits bestowed upon married couples are far
more than those given to individuals living in a domestic partnership. Thus,
domestic partnerships are a poor second to legal marriage; however, there are still
benefits to such a relationship. These include: (1) health insurance benefits they
would otherwise be unable to get; (2) social recognition of the relationship; (3)
creation of a dialog on discrimination issues in the workplace; and (4) proof of
growing recognition of the importance of attracting and keeping employees.146
III. LEGAL ISSUES: CHALLENGES TO DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS
A. Preemption
Generally, federal preemption is not a concern; however, ERISA is one federal
law that limits the ability of local governments to provide equal benefits between
married employees and employees registered in a domestic partnership.147 It
preempts any law that "relates to any employee benefit plan described" in ERISA,
unless it is specifically exempted.148
While ERISA does preempt local ordinances, most preemption will take place at
the state level. However, most activity in the area of domestic partnership is taking
place at the local level, and it is unclear as to the extent to which these local
governments may recognize these new relationships that are not recognized by state
law.149
Most states have strengthened local self-government by providing for municipal
home rule.150 Home rule provisions are generally of two types. The first is where
the municipality is treated as a state within a state. The city has full police power
over local affairs and some immunity from state legislative interference.151 A court
may find it difficult to distinguish between matters of state concern and local

146

Domestic
Partnership
Benefits
<http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p.html>.
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Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social
Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1203 (1992)
[hereinafter Bowman & Cornish]; see also Rickel, supra note 3 (discussion of how ERISA
effects domestic partner benefits).
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affairs.152 The court in Lilly v. City of Minneapolis,153 discussed infra, struggled with
just such an issue. The second type of home rule is generally referred to as the
"legislative" model. This model gives local governments all the powers the
legislature could grant except those restricted or denied to the municipality by the
legislature.154
Generally, however, if a local government forbids something authorized by the
state or allows something forbidden by the state, the provision will be struck down.155
Express preemption is unlikely in the field of domestic partnerships as no state has
expressly prohibited municipalities from recognizing these relationships thus far.156
In addition, courts frequently allow local regulation that seems to conflict with a
state statute by prohibiting something the state has permitted by implication;
however, if the state is held to have occupied the field, then the regulation will be
struck down.157
Even if there is no conflicting state statute, local governments may be precluded
from legislating "if the state has occupied or preempted the field in a matter of
statewide or general concern."158 California's Supreme Court has come up with the
following test to determine whether implied preemption exists:
In determining whether the Legislature has preempted by implication to
the exclusion of local regulation we must look to the whole purpose and
scope of the legislative scheme. There are three tests: ‘(1) the subject
matter has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to
clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern;
(2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched
in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not
tolerate further or additional local action; or (3) the subject matter has
been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such a nature
that the adverse effect of . . . local [regulation] on the transient citizens of
the state outweighs the possible benefit to the [local government].’159
A court may also strike down a regulation where it concludes that the ordinance
conflicts with state policy.160
It is difficult to determine whether the court will find that a field has been
preempted. Each jurisdiction has its own home rule provisions and statutory
schemes.161 However, in recent years, local governments have been allowed to make
152
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strong laws in areas such as public health, education, housing, employment, and
mass transit. Municipalities have been given fairly wide latitude in these areas.162
Although marriage and divorce are regulated at the state level, this does not
necessarily preempt the entire area of domestic relations law.163 However, local
governments would be expressly preempted from providing benefits such as the
ability to file joint tax returns or the right to adopt children. These benefits and
consequences of traditional marriage could not be provided by local ordinance to
domestic partners.164
B. Court Decisions in the Area of Preemption
Lilly v. City of Minneapolis: Health Insurance for Domestic Partners Denied
The case of Lilly v. City of Minneapolis involves a domestic partnership
ordinance for the City of Minneapolis.165 The City is a home rule charter
municipality whose charter was adopted by election on November 2, 1920.166 On
January 25, 1991, City Council passed the Domestic Partnerships Ordinance which
defines domestic partners as two adults who:
(1) Are not related by blood closer than permitted under marriage laws of
the state; (2) Are not married or related by marriage; (3) Are competent to
enter into a contract; (4) Have no other domestic partner with whom the
household is shared, or with whom the adult person has another domestic
partner; (5) Are jointly responsible to each other for the necessities of life;
(6) Are committed to one another to the same extent as married persons
are to each other, except for the traditional marital status and
solemnities.167
On November 17, 1992, the Commission on Civil Rights for the City ruled that
the employee benefits program discriminated against lesbian employees of the
Library Board based upon their "affectional preference."168 On April 2, 1993, City
Council passed a resolution authorizing reimbursement to city employees for health
insurance costs of domestic partners and qualified blood relatives who are not
considered dependents under current City health plans.169 The resolution excludes
reimbursement if the domestic partner or family member has access to other group
health insurance coverage or Medicare.170
162
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The court of appeals held that council resolutions authorizing reimbursement to
city employees for domestic partners' and non-dependent blood relatives' health
insurance costs were ultra vires and without legal force and effect.171 The court
reasoned that insurance coverage for political subdivisions' employees and their
dependents was of statewide concern.172 Therefore, the city's power to act must be
narrowly construed unless the legislature has expressed otherwise.173
The court considered the legislative history of the 1993 amendments to the
Minnesota Human Rights Act.174 The Act was amended to prohibit discrimination
based on sexual orientation.175 Prior to the vote to approve the amendment, the
author of the bill, Senator Spear, stated: "There is nothing in here about domestic
partners benefits. Nothing that could lead to it."176 Given this statement, the court
thought it was apparent that the legislature did not intend to give the same health care
benefits to domestic partners as are available to married employees.177 Therefore, the
City cannot expand a state statute with respect to whom may receive medical
benefits when the legislature has made it a matter of statewide concern and has
defined who may receive such benefits.178
Atlanta v. McKinney: No Employee Benefits for Persons Who Are Not
Dependents under State Law
The Atlanta v. McKinney case also concerned the issue of preemption in domestic
partner law.179 The case involved a challenge to four city ordinances "that prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, establish a domestic partnership
registry for jail visitation, and extend insurance and other employee benefits to
domestic partners of [C]ity employees."180 The court held that the City had the
power to enact the anti-discrimination and registry ordinances, but exceeded its
authority in extending employee benefits to persons not defined as "dependents"
under state law.181
As to the extension of employee benefits, the issue before the court was "whether
the [C]ity impermissibly expanded the definition of dependent to include domestic
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partners."182 The Municipal Home Rule Act (MHRA) grants cities the authority to
provide insurance benefits for city employees and their dependents, but does not
define the term "dependent."183 However, other state statutes defined a dependent
either as a "spouse, child, or one who relies on another for financial support."184 The
court held that domestic partners did not meet any of the statutory definitions of
"dependent."185 Since the court found it was beyond the City's authority to define
dependents inconsistent with state law, the benefits ordinance was invalidated as
ultra vires under MHRA and the Georgia Constitution.186
Atlanta v. Morgan: Domestic Partner Benefits Upheld
After Atlanta v. McKinney, the Atlanta City Council passed another ordinance
which provides certain insurance benefits to domestic partners of City employees
who are registered as domestic partners under the City's registry.187 In enacting the
ordinance, the City followed the holding in McKinney and eliminated from the
ordinance's definition of dependent any language that recognized any new
relationship similar to marriage.188 The new ordinance was again challenged.189
The issue in this case was the same as that in McKinney: "Whether the [C]ity
acted within its authority to provide benefits to its employees and their dependents
by defining 'dependent' consistent with State law."190 The court determined that it
must look to the ordinary meaning of the term "dependent" in order to decide
whether the definition provided in the City's benefit ordinance is consistent with
State law.191 The ordinance defines the term "dependent" as "one who relies on
another for financial support."192 In addition, the domestic partner shall be dependent
if:
(i) The employee makes contributions to the domestic partner of cash and
supplies, and the domestic partner relies upon and uses those contributions
to support himself/herself in order to maintain his or her standard of
living. The contributions may be at irregular intervals and of irregular
amounts, but must have existed for at least six months, and must be
continuing.
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(ii) The employee is obligated, based upon his/her commitment set forth
in the Declaration of Domestic Partnership, to continue the financial
support of the domestic partner for so long as the domestic partnership
shall be in effect.
(iii) The domestic partner is supported, in whole or in part, by the
employee's earnings, and has been for at least the last six months.193
Based on the court's review of Georgia case law, the court concluded the
ordinance's definition of dependent was consistent with the ordinary meaning of
"dependent" and the definition attributed to the term as used in Georgia statutes.194
The court looked to various dictionary definitions and prior case law.195 In finding
that the definition was consistent with State law, the ordinance was found not to be
in violation of either the Georgia Constitution or the Municipal Home Rule Act.196
Anonymous v. City Light: Federal Law Preemption
After a decision in Anonymous v. City Light, federal law was found to preempt
the application of the ruling to private employers.197 In this case, an employee of
City Light was denied medical and dental benefits for her domestic partner. The
Human Rights Department ruled against City Light concluding that discrimination
against "cohabitants" or "domestic partners" is a form of marital status
discrimination which is prohibited under Seattle's Fair Employment Practices
Ordinance (FEPO).198 The ruling was initially believed to apply to both city and
private employers within Seattle; however, Seattle's city attorney later determined
that provisions of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
preempted the FEPO as applied to private employers.199
C. Other Court Challenges
The following cases offer a framework of additional case law on the subject of
domestic partner benefits.
Donovan v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board of the State of California:
Death Benefits Granted
In Donovan v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board of the State of California,
Earl Donovan was eventually awarded $25,000 in death benefits for the death of his
live-in companion, Thomas Finnerty.200 Finnerty became one-hundred-percent
193
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disabled due to an injury sustained on the job. He became seriously depressed about
his disability and died after attempting suicide.201 Donovan filed a claim for death
benefits alleging that Finnerty's injury led to his suicidal tendencies, and, therefore,
his death was work-related.202
The Workers' Compensation Board held that the two men's relationship was
"illicit;" therefore, Donovan was not a "good faith member of Finnerty's household,"
and Donovan was awarded limited medical costs.203 Donovan appealed this decision
to the California Court of Appeals, which remanded the decision back to the Board
to decide the issue of dependency.204 The Board, relying on Marvin v. Marvin,205
ruled that Donovan was a "good faith member of Finnerty's household and his total
dependent."206 The court recognized that a gay person could be a "good faith
member of another's household." Therefore, that person could be considered the
employee's dependent for workers' compensation purposes.207
Brinkin v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.: Funeral Leave Benefits Denied
In Brinkin v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., Brinkin was denied funeral
benefit leave when his same-sex partner of eleven years died.208 The benefit was
automatically available to married employees.209 The union denied Brinkin's
201

Id.

202

Id. at 257-58.

203

Id. at 258.

204

Id.

205
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suitable basis on which trial court could render declaratory relief; and that the complaint also
could be amended to state a cause of action founded on theory of implied contract or equitable
relief.").
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grievance, and Brinkin brought action against the union and his employer.210 Brinkin
brought his action in federal court alleging that the denial of funeral benefits violated
his privacy rights under the California Constitution, violated the California Fair
Employment Act and Housing Act, and violated the San Francisco police code.211
The district court remanded the action back to the state court after concluding it had
no jurisdiction in the case.212
The case finally reached the California Court of Appeals where the court held
that employers may lawfully grant benefits to married persons without offering them
to unmarried persons.213 Brinkin was classified by the courts as a single, adult male
and not an immediate family member of his domestic partner.214
Hinman v. Department of Personnel Administration: Denial of Dental Benefits
In Hinman v. Department of Personnel Administration,215 the California Court of
Appeals held that the denial of dental benefits to domestic partners of employees did
not unlawfully discriminate against homosexual employees in violation of the Equal
Protection clause because the Department's policy made a distinction on the basis of
marital status not between heterosexual or homosexual employees.216 Because there
was no discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, strict scrutiny analysis did
not apply.217 In addition, the policy of restricting coverage to spouses and families
was found to be reasonably related to the state's interest in promoting marriage.218
Also, dental benefits under state plans qualified as bona fide fringe benefits and were
exempted from marital status discrimination.219
In Hinman, the employee, Hinman, and Larry Beatty had lived together for over
twelve years.220 The two men owned a home together, placed their assets in a joint
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Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 167 Cal. App. 3d 516 (Cal. Ct. App.
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bank account, shared common necessities of life, and named each other as primary
beneficiaries in their wills and life insurance policies.221
Hinman applied for dental coverage for himself and Beatty under the state's
employee dental plan; however, coverage for Beatty was denied.222 Hinman filed a
letter of grievance with the Department, but his grievance was denied on the basis
that Beatty did not qualify as a spouse or dependent under existing contracts or
statutes.223 Hinman filed a petition for writ of mandate for declaratory relief and
injunctive relief. The Department responded by way of demurrer which was
sustained by the trial court without leave to amend.224
The court of appeals found that there were no allegations or evidence that
benefits were denied based entirely on Hinman's sexual orientation, and this was a
case of "alleged under-inclusiveness of governmental regulation or legislation."225
Therefore, the differentiation between groups alleged to be "similarly situated"
becomes the basis of a de facto discrimination claim.226
Hinman argued that homosexual employees with same-sex partners are similarly
situated to married heterosexual employees.227 He further argued that because
homosexuals cannot legally marry, the term "spouse" is not neutral to homosexuals
and is a classification based on both marital status and sexual orientation.228
Therefore, Hinman believed the court must use strict scrutiny analysis because
classifications based on sexual orientation are suspect.229
The court disagreed with Hinman's arguments. The eligibility requirements for
the state dental plan excluded all nonspouses of both opposite- and same-sex
employees.230 The court concluded, "[h]omosexuals are simply a part of the larger
class of unmarried persons, to which also belong the employees' filial relations and
parents, for example. The terms have the same effect on the entire class of
unmarried persons."231 Therefore, there was no difference in the effect of the
eligibility requirement on unmarried heterosexual or homosexual employees.232
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Thus, Hinman is not similarly situated to married heterosexual employees but is
similarly situated to unmarried heterosexual employees.233
The court also found that the restriction of coverage to spouses and family of
employees was reasonably related to the state's interest in promoting marriage.234
California courts have allowed marital status discrimination as long as it is rationally
related to a legitimate state purpose.235 The court found that the state has a legitimate
interest in promoting marriage, and this interest can be furthered by "conferring
statutory rights upon married persons which are not afforded unmarried partners."236
This decision established a strong precedent in the area of domestic partner
benefits for homosexual employees. By not granting review, California's Supreme
Court has established that denial of benefits to unmarried homosexual partners does
not violate employment policy and statutory protections prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination.237
Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Commission: Denial of Family Health
Insurance Coverage
In Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Commission,238 the court held that an
employer could limit dependent health insurance coverage to employees' spouses and
children without violating marital status, sexual orientation, or gender provisions of
the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act.239 In addition, the court found that the rule did
not violate state equal protection.240
Phillips and Tommerup had a committed lesbian relationship in which they
shared incomes, rented a home, and owned a car together. They carried joint renters
and car insurance and also took vacations together. Tommerup had been financially
dependent on Phillips for several years, because she was attending college in pursuit
of her graduate degree.241 Phillips applied to her employing agency to change her
health care benefits from single to family coverage to provide for Tommerup as her
"dependent."242 The administrator of the state health insurance plan denied her
application on the basis that Tommerup did not meet the definition of "dependent"
under the applicable rules.243 Phillips filed a discrimination complaint with the
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personnel commission which was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, and the circuit court affirmed.244
Phillips argues that limiting health insurance coverage to the employee's spouse
and children discriminates against her on the basis of her marital status, sexual
orientation, and gender in violation of the Fair Employment Act.245 The court
disagreed with Phillips arguments and addressed each one in turn.246
The court looked to the legislative history of the act to determine legislative
intent. It found that the legislature did not intend a violation of the act where married
employees are treated differently than single employees under the current benefits
scheme. Nothing in the legislative history supported the contention that the state is
prevented from providing benefits to an employee's spouse without extending them
to an unmarried companion.247 In addition, the court found that there was no
discrimination issue because Phillips was not "similarly situated" to a married
employee in the context of a discrimination analysis.248 Phillips had no legal
relationship to Tommerup. The law imposed no duty of support and no
responsibility for providing medical care as it did on married couples.249 Thus,
Phillips's legal status was not found to be similar to that of a married employee, and,
therefore, she has no claim of marital status discrimination.250
Phillips's argument that she was discriminated against based on her sexual
orientation was essentially the same position she took in her marital status
discrimination argument.251 The court agreed with the personnel commission's ruling
that she was not discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation because the
challenged rule distinguishes between married and unmarried employees and not
between homosexual and heterosexual employees. Coverage would be denied for
Tommerup if their relationship was that of an unmarried heterosexual couple.252 The
court further notes that the fact Phillips and Tommerup cannot legally marry is not a
basis for a claim of sexual orientation discrimination. The claim is that the laws are
unfair because they do not recognize homosexual marriages.253 It is this restriction
that limits Phillips's eligibility for family coverage and that is for the legislature to
change, not the courts.254
Phillips also argued that she was being discriminated against because of her
gender due to the fact she was being treated differently than similarly situated males.
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The basis of her argument was that she could never qualify her partner as a
"dependent" through the act of marriage, whereas, a male employee could marry
Tommerup and qualify her as a dependent.255 The court again disagreed with
Phillips and held that the only males she was similarly situated to were those with
same sex partners, and that they also could not obtain coverage for their
companions.256
Phillips also made a claim that the rule violated the equal protection guarantees
of the Wisconsin Constitution "in that it creates a classification of people who are
denied certain employment benefits on the basis of marital status, sexual orientation
and gender."257 The court rejected her argument and found that because the rule
challenged in this case does not classify by sexual orientation and gender, that ends
the inquiry into an equal protection claim.258
The court in Phillips followed the same rationale as that used in Hinman. Both
courts refused to grant unmarried couples the same access to employment benefits as
those provided to married couples.259
Gay Teachers Association v. Board of Education of the City School Distroct of
New York: Health and Dental Benefits denied
In Gay Teachers Association v. Board of Education of the City School District of
New York, several teachers and employees sued the New York City Board of
Education in order to obtain health and dental benefits for their domestic partners.260
The employees were denied the benefits on the basis that only "legal spouses" were
entitled to such benefits.261 The plaintiffs argued that this denial of benefits
unlawfully discriminated against them on the basis of marital status and thereby
constituted sexual orientation discrimination.262 In October of 1993, Mayor David
Dinkins signed a court settlement which provides health benefits to all unmarried
domestic partners of New York City employees.263
Reep v. Commissioner of the Department of Employment and Training:
Approval of Unemployment Benefits
In Reep v. Commissioner of the Department of Employment and Training,264 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the fact a "former employee was
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not married to her partner of thirteen years did not preclude determination that she
had 'urgent, compelling and necessitous' reason to leave her employment in
connection with her decision to remain with [her] partner, who was relocating his
business, for purposes of determining employee's entitlement to unemployment
benefits."265
The plaintiff, a teacher in Norwell, declined an offer of reappointment for the
following school year because her partner of thirteen years was relocating and she
planned to go with him.266 After the move, she was unable to obtain a teaching
position and applied for unemployment benefits.267 The Department of Employment
and Training denied her claim because her decision to relocate with her partner did
not constitute an "urgent, compelling and necessitous" reason.268 The board of
review affirmed, and the plaintiff sought judicial review.269 The district court
reversed the agency's decision, and this court transferred the case on its own motion
and affirmed the district court judgment.270
The court inferred from the broad language of the statute that the legislature
intended to provide standards that were flexible enough to insure effective
application of legislative policy in all circumstances, and that these standards cannot
be applied with "mathematical precision."271 The court believed that it would be
improper to create a rule where a nonmarried partner is denied an opportunity to
show that his or her reasons for terminating employment were as "urgent,
compelling, and necessitous" as those of a married person.272 In addition, the court
believed that workable standards could be created for making such determinations.273
It found the extra administrative burden did not justify the denial of benefits to
persons "who can prove they acted reasonably, based on pressing circumstances, in
leaving employment."274
Rovira v. AT&T: Denial of Death Benefits
In Rovira v. AT&T, the court held that the partner of a deceased employee could
not collect death benefits even though the company promised not to discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation.275 The employee and Rovira lived together for twelve
years during which time the couple pooled financial resources, shared responsibility
265
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for decision making that affected their lives, owned a home together, and took
vacations together.276 In addition, Rovira was listed as the beneficiary of the
employee's life insurance policy, and, under the employee's will, was named
executor of the estate.277
After the employee's death, Rovira requested the "sickness-death benefit" for
herself and her children under AT&T's benefit plan.278 This benefit provided one
year's salary to the surviving spouse or unmarried children of an employee who died
as a result of illness.279 Even though AT&T's personnel policies prohibited
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or marital status, Rovira's request
was denied because the women were not legally married, and the children were not
the biological or adoptive children of the employee.280
The court ruled that noncompliance with its discrimination policy was
permissible because the policy did not appear in the benefit plan documents;
therefore, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) would not require
AT&T to comply with its promise.281
Ross v. Denver Department of Health & Hospitals: Denial of Family Sick Leave
In Ross v. Denver Department of Health & Hospitals, the court held that the
denial of sick leave benefits did not violate the rule prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination, and the classification system used in the rules did not violate the Due
Process or Equal Protection clauses.282 Ross requested sick leave benefits to take
care of her domestic partner.283 The Department of Health and Hospitals denied her
request, because domestic partner did not meet the definition of "immediate family"
as defined by the Career Service Authority Rules.284 She appealed the Department's
decision.285
A hearings officer found that the definition of "immediate family" discriminated
against Ross on the basis of sexual orientation which violated the Career Service
Authority's anti-discrimination rule and ordered the Department to grant her
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request.286 The Department appealed this decision to the Board which reversed the
hearings officer ruling.287 Ross sought judicial review in the district court which
reversed the Board's decision and reinstated the hearing officer's order.288 The court
of appeals found that the district court erred in ruling that the denial of Ross's sick
leave violated the Career Service Authority Rule against discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation.289
The Career Service Authority defined "immediate family" as: "[h]usband, wife,
son, daughter, mother, father, grandmother, grandfather, brother, sister, son-in-law,
daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, [and] sister in law."290
Ross acknowledged that her partner did not fall within this definition but argued that
this definition was superseded and invalidated by a subsequent rule which states:
"[T]he following administrative actions relating to personnel matters shall be subject
to appeal: . . . . c) Discriminatory actions: any action of any officer or employee
resulting in alleged discrimination because of race, color, creed, national origin, sex,
age, political affiliation, or sexual orientation."291 The court, however, disagreed
with Ross's argument and concluded that the fact this rule was promulgated later than
the rule which defined "immediate family did not mandate a conclusion that it had a
superseding effect.292 The court pointed out that Ross cited no legislative history to
support her argument.293
The court found that homosexual employees, such as Ross, were not precluded
from taking advantage of family sick leave benefits. The employee may use such
benefits to take care of any person fitting the definition of "immediate family."294
The only portion of the definition that affected homosexuals differently is the
language allowing the employee to use the benefit to care for a husband or wife;
however, this portion did not differentiate between heterosexual and homosexual
employees but rather between unmarried and married ones.295
Therefore,
homosexual employees and unmarried, or similarly situated, heterosexual employees
were not being treated differently.296
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Ross further argued that the definition contained in the Authority's rules violated
the Equal Protection and Due Process guarantees of the Colorado and United States
Constitutions because it created a class of people denied benefits on the basis of their
sexual orientation.297 The court disagreed with Ross's argument reiterating its point
that Ross was not treated differently than other unmarried employees and ruled that
she had not established a claim of denial of equal protection or due process.298
Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters v. Rutgers State University: Denial of
Health Benefits
In Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters v. Rutgers State University, employees
and their union appealed a decision of the Division of Pension which denied health
insurance coverage to the employees' same-sex domestic partners.299 After the
plaintiffs' requests for health insurance coverage for their same-sex partners were
denied, they filed a grievance against Rutgers alleging discrimination; however, their
grievance was denied.300 The plaintiffs then filed a complaint with the Law Division
against Rutgers and other defendants alleging discrimination and violations of the
New Jersey Constitution.301 The case was transferred to the Appellate Division
where the court found in favor of the University and the other defendants.302
All of the plaintiffs were professors at the University. Each had lived with their
same-sex partner for over fourteen years, shared property and other financial
obligations, and in one situation, raised a child together.303 The plaintiffs argued that
the statutory term "dependent" should be read to include domestic partners who are
the functional equivalent of spouses.304 They used the Law Against Discrimination
employee also would not be permitted to take sick leave benefits to care for an opposite-sex,
non-spouse partner. The court also stated that, because the rule does not classify or
differentiate on the basis of sexual orientation, there was no denial of equal protection or due
process. The court found that the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses simply require
like treatment of persons who are similarly situated. Consequently, since unmarried
homosexuals were treated the same as unmarried heterosexuals, the DCSB rule presented no
constitutional problems.").
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Programs
The University of Iowa offers faculty, professional and scientific staff
the ability to insure their same sex domestic partner under various benefit
programs. These programs include health, dental, vision, hearing aid, and
accidental death and dismemberment insurance. This document will
explain how these programs work for individuals in this situation. The
University does not contribute towards the cost of any benefit program for
your domestic partner. It only allows your domestic partner the access to
an insurance product.
The University benefit program for its faculty and professional staff is
considered a Section 125 flexible benefits program. The program is
regulated by the I.R.S. and as a result, domestic partners are not permitted
to participate in this program as a spousal equivalent. Instead, we offer
your domestic partner the ability to carry their own insurance contract for
each of the plans that are offered. Therefore, the flexible benefits
enrollment materials that you as an employee receive each year will be for
you. There is an exception to this general rule. The exception is if your
domestic partner meets the Internal Revenue Service dependency
guidelines, then your domestic partner may be included under the flexible
benefits program. These dependency guidelines require that the domestic
partner be totally dependent upon you for all living and income sources. If
you feel that you meet this qualification, you must notify the Benefits
Office in order to qualify for this special program. Otherwise, you and
your partner will be considered separately for benefit purposes.
In order to insure a domestic partner, you must register that individual
with the University Benefits Office. This is done by completing the
Affidavit for Domestic Partner form that is attached to this document. A
second attached document explains the criteria required for this domestic
partner relationship. You need only to complete this affidavit once and it
will remain in effect until such time as the relationship ends. It is your
responsibility to notify the Benefits Office if a domestic partner
relationship ends. A new affidavit would then have to be filed if another
relationship comes into existence in the future.
Once you have registered with the University Benefits Office, you will
receive a special insurance application form which must be completed by
your partner. On this application form, your partner will designate the
particular benefits in which they wish to participate. These benefit
programs do not have to be the same benefit programs in which you are
participating. There will be no medical questionnaire or pre-existing
condition clauses involved in the coverage for your domestic partner. The
effective date of the coverage will be assigned by the Benefits Office. It is
generally the first of the month following the receipt of the completed
application form.
When the completed insurance application has been received by the
University Benefits Office, your domestic partner will receive their own
identification cards for the /dental insurance plans that they have selected.
All claims will be filed by your partner under their own social security
number. As far as any provider or insurance company is concerned, the
domestic partner is an employee at The University of Iowa for insurance
purposes. The domestic partner will receive all appropriate mailings and
handouts concerning the selected insurance product.
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Children of either you or your domestic partner may be insured under
any of the benefit programs. If the children are your legal responsibility
and you have the financial responsibility for them for health insurance,
you will be given additional contributions from the University towards the
cost of insuring these dependents. If this is the situation, you must supply
the Benefits Office with the appropriate paperwork such as birth
certificates, adoption paperwork, or divorce decrees in order to prove this
financial relationship. If the dependent children are your domestic
partner's, then there is no contribution for these individuals, but they may
be included under your domestic partner's insurance plan. They cannot be
included under your plans since they have no legal or financial ties to you.
If there is a joint adoption relationship, then the dependent children may
be included under your plans and you will also receive additional
contributions from the University towards these costs.
The cost associated with the particular benefits that your domestic
partner selects will be deducted from your paycheck on a monthly basis.
These deductions will occur on an after-tax basis. Current Internal
Revenue Service rules do not permit domestic partner benefits to be paid
for with pre-tax money.
Federal and state COBRA regulations apply to your domestic partner.
This means that if you or your domestic partner's insurance is canceled as
a result of termination of employment, ending of the domestic partner
relationship, or a child no longer qualifying as a dependent, the individual
who loses the coverage will be eligible to continue the insurance on a
voluntary basis for a period of time from 18 to 36 months, depending upon
the reason for the loss of coverage. If and when an event such as this
happens, the Benefits Office will notify the individuals involved of their
particular rights under this legislation.
The issue of benefits for your domestic partner is complex. If you
have additional questions, please feel free to contact the Benefits Office
directly at 335-2676. As a note, all information supplied by you and your
domestic partner is kept confidential and this information is not released to
the insurance carrier or any party outside of the Benefits and Payroll
departments which are involved in the processing of the enrollments and
deductions.
Domestic Partners Eligibility
A qualified domestic partner, as defined below, is eligible to apply for
coverage under The University of Iowa Health, Dental, Vision, and
Hearing Aid Insurance plans.
To be eligible for coverage as a Domestic Partner, the University
employee and the Domestic Partner must complete and file with the Staff
Benefits Office an "Affidavit of Domestic Partnership" in which they
attest that (a) are each other's sole domestic partner, responsible for each
other's common welfare, (b) domestic partner must not be able to qualify
for coverage as a common law spouse, (c) party is married, (d) partners
are not related by blood closer than would bar marriage in the State of
Iowa, (e) partner is at least 18 years of age and of the same sex, and (f)
three of the following conditions exist for the partners:
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(LAD) to further support their argument. Because LAD prohibited discrimination
against an employee based on marital status and sexual orientation, they argued that
it would be a violation of LAD to deny them coverage.305 However, the court
rejected this argument pointing out that LAD excepted from its provisions benefit
and insurance programs.306

1.
The partners have been residing together for at least twelve (12)
months prior to filing the Affidavit of Domestic Partnership.
2.
The partners have common or joint ownership of a residence
(home, condominium, or mobile home).
3.

The partners have at least two of the following arrangements:

a. joint ownership of a motor vehicle; b. a joint credit account;
c. a joint checking account; or d. a lease for a residence identifying both
domestic partners as tenants
4.
The Domestic Partner (a) been designated as a beneficiary of the
employee's University of Iowa Group Life Insurance coverage, or (b) been
designated as a beneficiary for the death benefit payable from the
employee's retirement annuity contract, or (c) University employee
declares that the Domestic Partner is identified as a primary beneficiary in
the employee's will.
5.
The Domestic Partners have executed a "relationship contract,"
which (a) each of the parties to provide support for the other party and (b)
provides, in the event of the termination of the domestic partnership, for a
substantially equal division for any property acquired during the
relationship.
Additional Provisions
1.
Notification of Changes. The parties must agree to notify the
Benefits office of any change in the circumstances which have been
attested to in the documents qualifying a person for coverage as a
Domestic Partner.
2.
Liability for False Statements. If any company or the University
suffers a loss because of a false statement contained in the documents
submitted in connection with coverage for a Domestic Partner or as a
consequence of the failure to notify the Benefits Office of a changed
circumstance, the company or the University will be entitled to recover
reasonable attorney fees in addition to damages for all such losses.
3.
Termination. Either member of a domestic partnership may file
a statement with the Benefits Office indicating the relationship has ended.
A copy of the termination will be mailed to the other partner unless both
have signed the termination statement.
4.
Waiting Period. Following the termination of a Domestic
Partnership, a twelve-month period must elapse before a University
employee is eligible to designate a new Domestic Partner.).
305
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As to the plaintiffs' Constitutional claims, the court found no discriminatory
intent behind the marital status classification.307 The court cited several cases where
federal courts have held that sexual orientation classifications are not suspect.308 The
court concluded that if the federal court refused to find the classification suspect,
then it would not do so either, and, therefore, there was no reason to view marital
status or sexual orientation as deserving of heightened scrutiny.309 Instead, the
analysis turns on whether there was a "real and substantial relationship" between the
differential treatment and the State's interest in the classification.310
The court concluded that the state's interest should prevail. The importance of
affordable health insurance and the State's interest in objective determinations of
eligibility avoids a subjective analysis that would cause certain conflict in
establishing criteria.311 Therefore, the plaintiffs' due process and equal protection
arguments were denied.312
University of Alaska v. Tumeo: Health Insurance Benefits Allowed
In University of Alaska v. Tumeo, two employees of the University were denied
insurance benefits for their domestic partners, and they filed suit.313 The Superior
Court of Alaska found in favor of the employees314 and the Supreme Court of Alaska
affirmed.315
Both employees were unmarried and involved in a same-sex relationship.316 The
University denied the employees' requests for domestic partner benefits on the basis
that its "health care plan does not allow for coverage of a domestic partner, nor is
there any obligation under the plan to provide for such coverage."317 After the
University's denial of the employees' grievances, the plaintiffs appealed to the
superior court arguing that the University's health insurance program discriminates
on the basis of marital status in violation of the Alaska Constitution.318
The superior court held that "[t]he University, by providing added health care
coverage for married employees but not for unmarried employees, is compensating
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married employees to a greater extent than it compensates unmarried employees"
and that "using marital status as a classification for determining which of its
employees will receive additional compensation in the form of third-party health
coverage ... violates state laws prohibiting marital status discrimination."319 Further,
the court concluded that the definition of "dependent" that the University used was
unlawful.320
The University admitted that it discriminated against the employees based on
their marital status by "paying them less compensation than it pays other similarlysituated employees."321 However, they argue that this discrimination did not violate
the Human Rights Act, because the legislature did not intend to prohibit such
discrimination.322 The Supreme Court of Alaska disagreed with this argument and
held "[t]he clear and unambiguous language of the Human Rights Act forbids
discrimination in employment on the basis of marital status."323 As the superior court
noted, "to allow this basis for disparate treatment would be to eliminate the
prohibition against marital status discrimination. Any employer could raise the
argument with respect to any item of employee compensation."324
D. Equal Protection
As noted earlier in the introduction, employers that do offer domestic partner
benefits do not always extend these benefits to both homosexual and heterosexual
unmarried partners. Some employers offer these benefits to homosexual couples
only. These employers believe that heterosexual couples have the option of
marriage, whereas, gay and lesbian couples do not.325 Depending on state law and
whether the government is the employer, this reasoning leaves open the possibility of
an equal protection challenge.
An unmarried heterosexual couple, who has been denied benefits where benefits
are offered to homosexual couples, may attempt to argue an equal protection
violation based on gender discrimination. The argument may be based on the fact
that both the opposite- and same-sex couple are unmarried, and the only reason for
the denial of benefits to the opposite-sex couple is the fact that one of the partners in
the relationship is of a different gender than the other. If such an argument could be
made successfully, the court may use an intermediate standard of review when
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making its decision. Intermediate analysis is generally associated with cases
involving gender discrimination.326
The intermediate standard of review is not as difficult for the government to meet
as the strict scrutiny standard of review which requires a compelling state interest in
order for the government to prevail.327 In addition, the intermediate standard
involves far less deference to the legislature as does the rational basis test.328 Under
the intermediate standard, a classification will not be upheld unless it is found that
such classification has a "substantial relationship" to an "important" government
interest.329
Therefore, when arguing gender discrimination based on the fact you are an
unmarried heterosexual couple as opposed to a homosexual couple, it must be shown
that the law or policy is not substantially related to an important governmental
interest. The government may argue that they have an important interest in the
preservation of marriage and the maintenance of family; however, they may be
contradicting this argument by offering privileges to some unmarried couples—
homosexuals—while excluding non-married heterosexual couples.
Another way a non-married heterosexual couple may bring an equal protection
challenge is by alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In 1997, in
the City of Milwaukee, the City Attorney's office issued a legal opinion which stated
that any domestic partner benefit proposal must include heterosexuals as well as
homosexuals.330 According to the opinion, failure to include heterosexuals would
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.331 In addition, the City of Oakland
may face a court challenge to its domestic partner law based on sexual orientation
discrimination because it extends benefits to homosexual couples and not unmarried
heterosexual couples.332 If such a challenge prevails, other employers offering
domestic partner benefits to same-sex couples only may face similar challenges.
Although some have argued for strict scrutiny review in sexual orientation
discrimination cases, the basis of review is likely to be rational basis review.333
Under the rational basis test, "the classification only has to have a rational
relationship to any legitimate governmental interest in order to comply with the
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equal protection guarantee."334 The court will uphold a classification under this
standard "unless no reasonably conceivable set of facts could establish a rational
relationship between the classification and an arguably legitimate end of
government."335
The employee will have to prove that the law or policy has no rational
relationship to a legitimate end of government. The government or employer may
argue that the preservation of marriage and family is a legitimate end and that not
extending benefits to unmarried heterosexual couples is rationally related to that
purpose. However, as noted earlier, the government or employer may be
contradicting themselves because they are offering benefits to some married
employees but not to others. The employee may argue that his or her sexual
orientation—heterosexual—is the only basis for denial of such benefits.
The employer or government may be able to argue that unmarried heterosexuals
and homosexuals are not similarly situated because heterosexual couples have the
option to marry while homosexual couples do not.336 However, marriage may not be
the best option for all heterosexual partners in need of insurance benefits. Although
a non-married couple may be as committed to one another as that of a married
couple, religious beliefs or financial reasons, such as loss of government benefits,
may preclude such a couple from marrying.
In addition, the government may attempt to argue that married couples and
homosexual couples are similarly situated in every way except that which is
prohibited to them.337 However, it is difficult to determine whether such an argument
will prevail. In cases such as Hinman, discussed supra, the court ruled that
homosexuals were not similarly situated to married couples.338 However, other
courts such as that in University of Alaska, discussed supra, found that such
distinction constituted marital status discrimination.339
E. Alternative
Employers can avoid liability all together by simply eliminating all family
coverage.340 Under that scenario, there are no issues regarding discrimination or
equal pay because all employees' partners or spouses receive the same coverage
which happens to be none.341 However, this puts employees with families at risk of
financial disaster should a family member become seriously ill.342 In addition,
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employers opting not to provide family coverage will likely have trouble attracting
and retaining top employees.343
IV. THE PRESENT SITUATION
In late 1997, Representative Barney Frank of Massachusetts introduced a bill
which would make domestic partners of federal employees eligible for health
insurance coverage through the federal employee health program. These employees
would also be eligible for lifetime survivor benefits under the federal pension, life
insurance, and workers' compensation programs.344 Frank said it was time for the
federal government to "recognize that people who live in committed relationships,
regardless of their sexual orientation or marital status, ought to be eligible for the
same basic set of benefits, including health care coverage, life insurance, health
insurance and compensation for work injuries."345 Under the bill, labeled Domestic
Partnership Benefits and Obligations Act of 1997, the extended health and retirement
coverage would go to the following:
*Same- or opposite-sex couples (if one of them worked for the
government or postal service) who are "living together, in a committed,
intimate relationship."
*Couples who are responsible for each other's welfare and financial
obligations.346
Couples would have to submit an affidavit of eligibility for benefits to the Office
of Personnel Management. This affidavit would certify that the couple lived together
in a committed domestic relationship.347
Also in 1997, lawyers for the New York City Council were asked to draft a
domestic partner ordinance similar to one San Francisco adopted.348 Councilman
Tom Duane, the bill's backer, wants it to be modeled after the San Francisco
ordinance which requires city contractors to offer the same benefits to domestic
partners that are extended to spouses.349 The proposal differs from San Francisco's
ordinance in that San Francisco requires the couple to register with the city, whereas,
New York City's proposal would permit all employees, whether registered or not, to
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apply for coverage.350 However, the proposal would require employees to provide
some proof of their partner status to employers.351
It should be noted that if same-sex marriages become legal, then homosexuals
who do marry will likely receive the same benefits legally married couples currently
receive.352 This diminishes the need for domestic partnerships of same-sex couples.
Should this happen, unmarried heterosexuals who are challenging laws and policies
that offer benefits to same-sex partners may find that their argument of being
"similarly situated" does not have the same impact as it did before. It would then be
an argument of "unmarried" versus "married" employees. There would be no group
of employees, other than blood relatives and others such as minors, that would not be
allowed by the state to legally marry. The equal protection argument for unmarried
heterosexuals would not have the same "bite" as it did prior to the legalization of
same-sex marriages.
The federal government, however, has recently passed the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA), which may severely limit the number of states recognizing same-sex
marriages. DOMA allows states to choose not to recognize same-sex marriages that
were performed in other states.353 Several states have enacted legislation prohibiting
the recognition of such marriages.354 However, if a state does lift the ban on samesex marriages, DOMA will likely face constitutional challenges under both the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.355
V. CONCLUSION
The traditional concept of family is changing in the face of judicial and
legislative recognition of a broader definition of family. Because of this change in
the family structure, domestic partnerships have developed. These arrangements
offer an alternative to marriage for both same- and opposite-sex couples who either
cannot marry or choose not to marry due to religious reasons or other consequences.
As case law indicates, there is no consistency of judicial review in the area of
domestic partnerships. However, given the number of private and public employers
currently offering such benefits, it appears that domestic partnerships are becoming
the norm in our society. In addition, as governments and private employers vow not
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to discriminate based on marital status and sexual orientation, court challenges may
arise if these employers do not extend the same benefits to their unmarried
employees as they do to their married employees.
Although many employers currently offer domestic partner benefits to the samesex partners of their employees, some of these employers choose not to offer such
benefits to opposite-sex partners of unmarried employees. This may open the door
for a discrimination or equal protection challenge. Employers argue that the
differential treatment between unmarried opposite-sex and same-sex couples is
warranted, because same-sex couples do not have the option to marry. However,
there may be compelling reasons why opposite-sex couples cannot marry, therefore,
defeating that argument.
In order to avoid preemption, domestic partnership legislation should be enacted
at the state level. Such legislation allows social and legal recognition of these nontraditional unions and confers benefits without designating the relationship as a
marriage.356 This approach may be less oppressive to unmarried, but committed
couples.357
Although great strides have been made in the area of domestic partnership, not all
employers or jurisdictions recognize a need to confer such benefits. If employees
with non-traditional families want their employers to offer such benefits, they must
continue to lobby for these benefits by pointing out the unfairness and inequities in
not offering such benefits.358 As employees become more aware of compensation
differentials based upon marital status, there will likely be more of a push on
employers by their employees to offer such benefits.359 In addition, ordinances such
as the one San Francisco enacted may force employers to offer these benefits
whether they want to or not.360
Most employees rely on employment benefits for themselves and their families.
These benefits are considered part of an employee's compensation package and
provide financial and emotional support in the area of health care and retirement.361
No matter where you look in our society, benefits and protections are being offered
to married couples that are not available to unmarried couples.362 As employers
begin to recognize that offering benefits to non-traditional families of their
employees can be achieved at minimal cost, they may e more willing to extend
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these benefits.363 These employers will be able to attract and keep good employees
by offering benefits their competitors do not.
DEBBIE ZIELINSKI
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